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Notes and Comments
RES IPSA LOQUITUR AS APPLIED TO A RUNA-WAY CARLEWIS v. WOLK
The defendant parked Is car on a considerably inclined street, headed
down the grade. The automobile remained stationary for at least half an hour,
and perhaps longer. Then for some cause unknown, it rolled down the hill, and
struck and injured the plaintiff. The defendant testified, which testimony was
corroborated by a guest passenger, that he stopped the car, cut the front wheels
to the curb, set the emergency brake and got out. Two qualified mechanics also
testified that following the accident the emergency brake was found to be in
perfect mechanical order. The testimony of the defendant, his companion and
the two mechanics was not contradicted by other testimony.' The plaintiff introduced no evidence of probative value tending to show that the defendant was
negligent; instead, he chose to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish
his prima facie case. Following introduction of defendant's testimony, the trial
court directed a verdit for the defendant as follows:
"Gentlemen of the Jury, there has been no evidence produced before you gentlemen that this defendant was negligent, and
for that reason it becomes the duty of the Court to take the case
from your consideration and instruct this jury to find for the de"°
fendant.
Judgment on the verdict was entered and plaintiff appealed. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals held, as did the trial court, that the facts brought the case within the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant. The court stated that until the defendant had "
conclusively accounted for the accident
it remained a question for the jury
as to whether he was negligent.
The primary purpose of this note is to determine the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the case commented on herein.'
To bring a case
within the famous doctrine, all the authorities agree that there are three essential
elements which must be present: (1) the instrumentality must be under the
exclusive control or management of the defendant, (2) the circumstances, accord'We should not overlook the fact that the defendant was covered by liability
insurance, and the ultimate loss would fall ipon the ciiany.- Theref6ie the defendant had little to gain by the introduction of "manufactured" testimony, and
was to this extent an impartial witness.
Taken from the Court record.
'Lewis v. Wolk, 312 Ky. 536 -228 S.W 2d 482, 435 (1950).
' Once the facts of a case are made applicable to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, under the confused and conflicting opinions of the courts of last resort
in the various jurisdictions that have had occasion to use the doctrine, there is
authority to sustain the view of the Kentucky Court taken in the instant case, as
well as many other views. One writer goes so far as to say that the doctrine is
used in so many senses that "
in short it means nothing.
" Prosser, The
ProceduralEffect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MniN. L. REv. 241, 270 (1936).
A review of the Kentucky decisions reveals many inconsistencies as to the
procedural effect of the doctrine, the most recent cases having the apparent effect
of placing the ultimate burden of proof on the defendant.
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ing to common knowledge and experience, must create a clear inference that the
accident would not have happened if the defendant had not been negligent, and
(8) the plaintiff's injury must have resulted from the accident. -The italicized
word in each of the three elements serves as a warning that in order for the doc-.
trine to be applicable the factual pattern required must be clear, definite and
unequivocal.
Certainly the last element is present in the instant, case. Whether or not
the second element is present ordinarily depends upon the existence of the first
element. ' In other words, in the absence of control, the inference is deprived
of the all important circumstance which makes the drawing of the inference
possible. The cases, in applying or refusing to apply the doctrine to facts similar
to those in the instant case, limit their discussion almost entirely to the presence
or absence of the inference without dwelling on the control element. However,
in cases involving a runaway automobile, where the courts refuse an inference
of negligence to be drawn, it is manifest that they must have found that the
defendant did not have exclusive control, for if it is once established that the
defendant was in control at the time the automobile left its parking place, it would
be strange indeed to argue that an inference of negligence could not be properly
drawn. Thus, when the courts permit or refuse the inference to be drawn in
cases similar to the instant case, they are in effect determining at the same time
the presence or absence of the element of control. Any attempt to separate inference from control and to argue that the absence of one, without mentioning
the other, is grounds for refusing the doctrine must necessarily be avoided.
Any remark or comment pertaining to the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to automobile accident cases should be prefaced with the statement
that the courts have always hesitatingly applied the doctrine to automobile accidents for the reason that the defendant does not have exclusive control over the
circumstances which help to cause the accident. Not only must the defendant
have control over the instrumentality, but he must have the whole and exclusive
control."
In reference to the element of control, in cases involving automobile accidents, the statement is often made that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
only "
when both the apparatus and the operation of it are witlun the control
of the defendant
"1 While, perhaps, this statement does not warrant the
conclusion that the defendant must be in actual physical control,' it is suggestive
of circumstances that would preclude the possibility of control in some other person; i.e., such that the control could be properly chargeable to defendant, and
not to an intermedder.
The nature of the instrumentality is an important factor to be considered
in determining whether or not the defendant can be legally chargeable with control and the consequences thereof under varying circumstances. For instance,
if the instrumentality be inherently dangerous, the duty owed with respect to it
is great, and the nropnetor is deemed to be in control without regard to hus
physical proximity to the instrument. On the other hand, where the insrumentality, such as an automobile, is not inherently dangerous and the duty owed with

Prosser, The ProceduralEffect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MrIN L. Iuv. 241,

270 (1936).

665 C. J. S. 1014.
5 Am. Jun. 889.
865 C. J. S. 1017.
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respect to it is that of ordinary care, in order to establish control as contemplated
by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the need for proof of physical proximity is
much greater. No one would seriously contend that an automobile owner is liable
for injuries inflicted by his runaway car without regard to the cause as to why it
mysteriously moved. It is well settled that the duty owed is not absolute. The
very use and place of the automobile in our society make such a rule commendable as being in the best interests of the public. Hence, once the owner has acted
in an ordinarily prudent manner in parking his automobile, and it has been shown
that there was no antecedent negligence with respect to the maintenance and upkeep of his vehicle, he has fulfilled his duties. It obviously follows that he has
relinquished control.
How is it determined that he has or has not acted in a prudent manner?
In the ordinary case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant failed to act in a prudent manner. If the
plaintiff fails to sustain this burden the defendant is entitled td a verdict. However, if the plaintiff can bring his case within the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
he is given the benefit of certain inferences or presumptions which are sufficient
to establish the plaintiffs pruna facie case, and, consequently, the burden of
going forward with the evidence is placed upon the defendant.'
The unusual effects of the doctrine serve as a warning that it must be applied
sparingly and with caution."0 Not only is it contrary to ordinary rules of procedure
to infer negligence, but it is unfair to the defendant when the circumstances are
such that the accident or loss may be attributed to some other cause. It is only
when the fair and logical inference exists that the defendant's negligence was the
sole and proximate cause of the accident that the inference can be properly drawn.
This point is ably illustrated in the Pennsylvania case of East End Oil Co. v. Pa.
Torpedo Co."
"The maxim, 'Res ipsa loquitur is itself the expression
of an exception to the general rule that negligence is not to be inferred, but to be affirmatively proved. The ordinary apjplication of
the maxim is limited to cases of an absolute duty, or an obligation
practically amounting to that of an insurer. Cases not coming under
one or both of these heads must be those in which the- circumstances
are free from dispute, and show not only that they were under the
exclusive control of the defendant, but that in the ordinary course of
expenence no such result follows as that complained of. It is sometimes said that the mere happemng of an accident in this class of
cases raises a presumption of negligence, but this is hardly accurate.
Negligence is never presumed. If it were, it would be the duty of
the court, in the absence of exculpatory evidence by the defendant,
to direct a verdict for the plaintiff, whereas in these cases the question is for the jury The accurate statement of the law is not that
negligence is presumed, but that the circumstances amount to evidence from which it may be inferred by the jury. In cases where
the duty is not absolute
it is essential that it shall appear that
the transaction in which the accident occurred was in the exclusive
management of the defendant, and all the elements of the occurrence
within his control, and that the result was so far out of the usual
'The strength and force of the inferences and presumptions created by the
dictrmne are not proper subjects for treatment herein.
0 C. J. 1031, 1032.
11190 Pa. St. 350, 42 Atl. 707 (1899).
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course that there is no fair inference that it could have been produced
by any other cause than negligence. If there is any other cause apparent to which the injury may with equal fairness be attributed, the
inference of negligence cannot be drawn."
Thus, if it would be .mere conjecture to infer negligence, it is manifest that
the doctrine, with its inferences and ramifications, all of which are perverse to
the legal concepts firmly established in the law, should not be made applicable.
A jury should not be permitted to guess away the rights of the defendant by
merely letting the plaintiff present the facts of his suffering and then relying upon
the untutored sympathies of the jury to come to his aid regardless of the lack of
any substantial proof of fault on the part of the defendant.
The question now is: Was the defendant in control of is automobile at the
time of the collision so as to bring the case within the doctrine? The Kentucky
Court answers this question in the principal case by saying the defendant was
the 'last known human agency" to exercise control. But is this suficient? The
Appellate Court conspicuously omitted any discussion of the length of time the
defendant's automobile remained stationary from the time it was parked until it
mysteriously deserted its parking place and proceeded on its misguided, inl-fated
journey, whereas the courts in other jurisdictions have actually lunged their
opimons on this very point. The Massachusetts Court, in permitting the inference
of negligence to be drawn as a result of injuries inflicted by a runaway car, which
had remained stationary for only a "few minutes" said:
"So short of an interval had elapsed between the time
when the defendant left his unlocked automobile on a down grade
in the parking space and the time when it rolled down into the highway, of its own momentum so far as appears, and struck the plaintiff's vehicle, that the judge could infer properly that this happemng
was due to the negligence of the defendant."
Inference of negligence has been permitted where the vehicle remained
parked only from three to five mnutes;" where passengers were seated in the
back seat of the car, with no one in front seat, when the car left its parking place;'
where the driver left the car and returned fifteen minutes later to find that it bad
left its parking place; where the car had been illegally parked on a grade and
there was no evidence as to the time element, except that it was shortly after it
was parked;7 and where "Shortly after it was parked, probably within fifteen
minutes, it had
struck and injured appellee
" the court concluding,
"Although it is a close question, we are of opimon that the issue of negligence
"i
was one for the jury.
The foregoing cases are surrounded with facts and circumstances which permit of inferring negligence without indulging in mere conjecture. The defendant,
in each case, could be properly chargeable with control, either by shortness of
="Id, at -

42 AUt. at 708.

"Pelland v. D'Allesandro, 321 Mass. 387, 73 N.E. (2d) 590, 591 (1947).
" Henderson v. Homer, 287 Pa. 298, 135 Ad. 203 (1926); Helfrich v. Gurnan, 78 Pa. Super, Ct. 449 (1922); Klobe v. Public Market Delivery & Transfer
Co., 130 Wash. 302, 226 Pac. 1021 (1924).
"Glaser v. Schroeder, 269 Mass. 337, 168 N.E. 809 (1929).
" Sheridan v. Arrow Sanitary Laundry Co., 104 N.J.L. 608, 146 Ad.
191 (1929).
' lhott v. Seattle Chain & Mfg. Co., 141 Wash. 157, 251 Pac. 117 (1926).
" Williams v. Larkin, 166 Miss. 837, -- 147 So. 337, 339 (1933).
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time which the car remained stationary, or by convincing evidence that no one
could have tampered with the vehicle. Clearly, the holdings in the above cases
cannot be deemed authority for deciding the case commented on herein. Even
where the vehicle remained stationary, "probably fifteen minutes,"" the court
said it was a close question as to whether the issue of negligence was for the jury.
However, the cases are authority for the proposition that the time element is miportant in determining whether an inference of negligence is to be indulged in
plaintiff's favor.
In a Michigan case, -' where the defendant contended that his auto remained
stationary for thirty minutes, the court said:
"Manifestly if the machune remained where left on this
inclined street for this length of time, this fact would be confirmatory
of the claim that it had been properly parked. On the contrary, if
it left the pint in front of the Masomc Temple and proceeded down
the street some 400 feet and struck plaintiff within from 3 to 5 minutes, this fact might be considered by the jury together with the other
testimony in determining the crucial question of whether it was
properly parked.2'
The Washington Court in refusing to apply the doctrine in a case, where the
automobile remained stationary for several hours, said that the fact the car
"
stood on the incline from 6:30 or 70 clock in the evemng, until midnight,
or after, makes the rule of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable
" assuming the
doctrine to be otherwise applicable. The Nebraska Court, in a case " where the
car remained parked for only ten to twenty minutes before it descended the hill,
refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, saying:
"The fact that the automobile remained in the position
in which it was parked from 10 to 20 minutes before it descended
the bill is corroborative of defendant's testimony- it indicates that the
car was properly parked, and the circumstances surrounding the
accident are more consistent with the view that it was caused by some
unknown person releasing the brakes and turning the steering wheel
"I
than by the defendant's negligence
In a Louisiana case where the defendant was only one yard away when the car
started to move, the court, in refusing to apply the doctrine, stated:
"No one can positively state what caused the car to roll
after Mrs. Quesenberry got out of it. It is not pretended that the engine was running and the only accountable force that could have
moved it, is gravitation. We"understand from Mr. Beaullieu s testimoney that the floor of his station is not level, that it slants toward
the street and it may be that the weight of the car sarted it diagonally
down the incline and thus brought it in contact with the glass. Again
it may be that some other outside force, unseen by those who testified,

Id. at -147 So. at 839.
SFuller
231atMich.
Id. at --v. Magatti,
208 N.W
869. 213, 203 N.W 868 (1925).
-Joseph v. Schwartz, 128 Wash. 634, 224 Pac. 5 (1924).
"Id. at -- v. 224
Pac. at
"Buzzello
Sramek,
1106. Neb. 262, 193 N.W 743 (1928).
21

' Id. at --

193 N.W at 744.
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may have driven that car against the show window, But these are
only surmises.
"The facts in the record do not present a case coming
under the doctrine of 'Res ipsa loquitur and we do not feel justified
in finding Mrs. Quesenberry guilty of negligence under the condition of the proof as presented to this court."
The court stated that "
it was of course encumbent upon plaintiff to show
negligence on the part of Mrs. Quesenberry."' - The court, in declining to indulge
in inferences of negligence was merely .applying the same rule of law espoused in
the East End Oil Co. Case wherein it was stated:
"If there is any other cause apparent to which the injury
may with equal fairness be attributed, the inference of negligence
cannot be drawn."'
This view takes cognizance of the fact that in order for the doctrine to be applic
able the factual pattern must be unequivocal, and when loss is sustained under
circustances susceptible of more than one cause, such as surround automobile
accidents, an inference that one particular cause; namely, the defendant's negligence, caused the accident will not be indulged the plaintiff and the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur may not be applied.
The rule, as laid down by the New York Court, is thus:
"
the rule of res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied
where no negligence of the defendant is shown by direct evidence,
and it is apparent that there may have been other causes than defendant's negligence which led to the accident."'
In a case, involving a runaway truck, where only the chauffeur testified as
to proper parking, the New York Court reiterated the above rule, and stated:
"There is absolutely no evidence that, if the automobile
was left in the state to which the chauffeur testified, it could have
gone down the hill unless interferred with, and the mere fact that it
certainly remained in theposition in which it was left for several minutes before it started down the hill is some evidence that it was left
in a safe position. The circumstances of the accident, therefore, are
at least as consistent with the view that the accident was caused by
the act of a third person as by the defendant's negligence. In such
"
circumstances the rule of res ipsa loquitur does not apply
In the light of the above holdings, it is quite clear that the authorities support
the view that the instant case does not come within the doctrine. The decisive
element running through all these cases was whether there may have been other
causes than defendant's negligence which led to the accident. If there were,
then the doctrine was rejected. No one would seriously contend that in the instant case the accident could not have resulted from some intervening cause.
The most disturbing element of the instant case was the failure of the
Appellate Court to discuss the length of time the car remained stationary, the

' Globe Indemnity Company v. J. R. Quesenberry, 1 La. App. 364 (1924).
2 Id. at 366.
' See note 12 supra.
' Keenan v. MeAdams, 129 App. Div. 117, 113, N.Y.S. 343, 345 (1908).
'Keber v. Central Brewing Co., 150 N.Y.S. 986, 987 (1915).
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very point on which appellee vigorously sought to sustain the verdict which had
been directed in his favor. In the light of appellee s argument, this failure mdicates unequivocally that the court brushed this important factor aside as being
wholly immaterial. To require a person "
to explain what if anything, except his negligence
", caused the car to leave the curb, regardless of how
long it had been parked, is to label him an insurer. Even when the case is given
the res ipsa injection (as this case was), a very eminent authority' is critical of
the view that the defendant must explain the accident or pay, pointing out that
such a burden may amount to the imposition of strict liability without fault. This
eminent authority correctly points out that the result of this view is "
to give
circumstantial evidence a greater effect than any direct evidence could have."ui
Bearing in mind the limitations imposed on the application of the doctrine, it
would seem that all would agree that if an automobile remained at its parking
place for an hour or more it would be improper to apply the doctrine. The time
element alone would be the best evidence of proper parking and at the same time
allow a reasonable inference that some other cause than defendant's negligence
started the car on its way. On the other hand, if the car remained parked for
only three to five minutes, all would agree that negligence could be properly inferred and the doctrine could be properly applied. These two illustrations are
suggestive of a test which might be used in determimng the applicability of the
doctrine to a particular situation; namely, when the time is so short that it is
apparent that no other cause, except defendant's negligence, could have caused
the accident, the doctrine may be applied. Putting it in another way, where the
time element is of sufficient length so that it is apparent that there may have been
other causes than defendant's negligence which led to the accident, the doctrine
may not be applied.
It is not insisted that if the car mysteriously leaves its parking place after a
certain length of.time that the defendant cannot be held liable for damage caused
by the runaway automobile; direct evidence of negligence may still be found. The
mere contention is that after the vehicle has remained stationary for a reasonable
length of time, the element of control, as required under the doctrine, has become
extinct and the inference of negligence, which could have been reasonably drawn
had the car moved within from three to five minutes, cannot now be indulged the
plaintiff, but must be proved.
When it is recalled that an application of the doctrine seems to have the
effect, at least under recent Kentucky decisions, with the instant case being the
authority, of placing the ultimate burden of proof on the defendant, requiring
that he "explain or pay" the justification for the doctrine must be unmistakably
clear, definite and unequivocal. The writer comes to the conclusion that the
application of the doctrine to the facts of the instant case cannot, under principle,
reason or authority, be justified.
Removing the res ipsa veil from the instant case, certainly there was no question for the ]ury.'
The plaintiff failed to produce even a scintilla of evidence.
"' See note 3 supra.
Prosser, PRossER oN TORTS, (1941).
1 Id. at 305.
4 In its opinion, the court said, "Certainly the jury is authorized to balance
the accepted probability against the defendant's denial." Footnote 3, supra, at
435. Without admitting there was a "probability," probalilities should not even
be considered by the jury unless there is evidence tending to prove that the
probabilities are facts. The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Dunbar v. McGill,
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The only evidence tending to show that defendant was negligent was that adduced
from the circumstances surrounding the accident before the material facts were
revealed. The testimony of the defendant and his compamon, corroborated by
the very physical facts of the accident, namely, that the car remained stationary
for over thirty minutes, completely erased any circumstantial evidence of defendant's negligence. It is, therefore, earnestly believed that the decision randered
herein was ill-advised, that the trial court's handling of the case was proper, and
that its decision should have been affirmed.'
DELMER ISON

ADOPTED CHILD AS "LEGAL HEIR" UNDER ADOPTIVE
GRANDPARENT'S WILL - ISAACS v. MANNING
The issue in Isaacs v. Manning was whether an adopted daughter of a beneficiary could qualify as heir of the beneficiary under a testamentary trust.' The
will left an estate in trust for the children of the testator, with the following provision:
the trust
"Upon the death of any of my five children
as to a fifth part of my estate allotted to the one so dying shall cease
and the estate held for such child shall be paid to the legal heirs of
such deceased child."
The following statute was in effect at the testator s death:
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, section 2071, "Any person
may
state
that he is desirous of adopting a person
and making him capable of inheriting as heir-at-law of such petitioner; and
[the] court shall have authority to make an order
declaring such person heir-at-law of such petitioner, and as such capable of inheriting as though such person were the child of such petitioner.

I's

64 Mich. 676, -- 31 N.W 578, 581 (1887), has ably set forth the rule in regard
to probabilities: "The jury are not warranted in finding a fact established by
[even] a greater probability, unless, also, the evidence satisfied them that the fact
exists. The conclusion that it exists may be drawn from a preponderance of probabilities in its favor, but the probabilities must be such that the conclusion may
be and is drawn, or it is not proved." In the instant case, the fact to be proved
was one of negligence. The finding by the trial court that there was no evidence
tending to prove that the fact of negligence existed, supported by the valued testimony of the defendant and his companion corroborated by the physical facts of
the accident, certainly warranted the conclusion that the fact of negligence did
not exist and the "probability," if any, was removed, leaving nothing in the scales
to be weighed by the jury against the defendant's evidence.
'Upon retrying the case, a verdict was returned for the plaintiff. No mention of this was made in the case, but it would not be unfair, I think, to regard
the opinion of the appellate court as one in which the court sought either to lay
the loss upon the insurance company or to encourage the carrying of insurance in
the future by the defendant. In either event, the effect of such a policy can only
lead to a higher rate of insurance for automobile owners.
'312 Ky. 326, 227 S.W 2d 418 (1950).
Id. at 326, 227 S.W 2d at 419.

'CARROLL s KENTUCKY STATUTES secs. 2071-2072b, repealed in 1940; Ky.
REv. STAT. sections 405.140-405.240, provisions for adoption, repealed in 1946;

